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Abstract. We present what we call Constructive Default Logic (CDL) - a default logic in which the fixed-
point definition of extensions is replaced by a constructive definition which yield so-called constructive
extensions. Selection functions are used to represent explicitly the control of the reasoning process in this
default logic. It is well-known that Reiter's original default logic lacks, in general, a default proof theory. We
will show that CDL does have a default proof theory, and we will also show that this is related to the fact that
CDL has the existence property for constructive extensions and that it also has the semi-monotonicity
property. Furthermore, we will also show that, with respect to some counter-examples that were suggested by
Lukaszewicz, constructive extensions yield more intuitive conclusions than Reiter’s extensions. Hence,
constructive default logic does not only have heuristic advantages over Reiter’s default theory from a
computational point of view, but it is also more adequate with respect to knowledge representation.
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21. Introduction
A variety of non-monotonic formalisms have been proposed to formalize defeasible reasoning.
For a comprehensive survey of non-monotonic reasoning the reader is referred to [Bes89] and
[Luk90]. It is well-known that defeasible reasoning is very complex from a computational
viewpoint. For example, Kautz and Selman showed in [KS91] that even simple default
theories in Reiter's default logic are very hard to compute.
One of the sources of the complexity problems in default logic is its non-constructive
character. In [Rei80] Reiter defines extensions in default logic by a fixed-point definition,
which is not constructive. This definition only allows one to check whether a set of sentences
is an extension, but it provides no information about how to generate an extension. So, the
actual reasoning process (and all the decisions how to solve conflicts!) that leads to an
extension is left implicit in Reiter's default logic. In recent years it was observed by several
researchers that the complexity problem of default logic can be heuristically improved by
making the default reasoning process more constructive (for an extensive discussion of this
point see e.g. [Moi92] and [FM92a,b]). We have developed a constructive version of Reiter's
default logic. Constructive Default Logic (CDL) is a default logic in which the fixed-point
definition of extensions is replaced by a constructive definition. From a computational point of
view constructive extensions have a heuristic advantage over Reiter extensions. A detailed
discussion about the heuristic advantages of constructive default logic in comparison to
Reiter's default logic can be found in [TT92].
Apart from being non-constructive it is also well-known that Reiter's original default logic
lacks a default proof theory for non-normal default rules, which was already observed by
Reiter himself to be a weakness of his logic. In this paper we will show that CDL does have a
default proof theory, and we will also show that this is intrinsically related to the fact that
default theories in CDL always have a constructive extension (the existence property), and that
CDL also has the semi-monotonicity property. Reiter's default logic lacks these two
properties. Furthermore, we will show that, with respect to some counter-examples that were
suggested by Lukaszewicz, constructive extensions yield more intuitive conclusions than
Reiter’s extensions. Hence, constructive default logic does not only have heuristic advantages
over Reiter’s default theory from a computational point of view, but it is also more adequate
with respect to knowledge representation.
2. Constructive Default Logic
Constructive default logic is default logic in which the normal fixed-point extensions of Reiter
are replaced by so-called constructive extensions. Research on constructive default logic was
reported earlier in [Tan91], [Tan92a], [Tan92b], [TT91a] and [TT92]. Constructive
3extensions are parameterized by a selection function that is able to express the choice for the
extension to be generated. This selection function can be considered as a setting of a set of
control parameters that guides the reasoning. Thus we can parameterize the branching of the
defeasible reasoning process.
2.1 Extensions in Reiter's Default Logic
We give a brief summary of Reiter's default logic (see [Rei80], or [Bes89]). Default logic is a
classical logic extended with extra defeasible inference rules, the so-called default rules. We
write default rules as
(  : ”1,…, ”n / • ) ,
where , ”i and • are logical formulas. The formula  is called the prerequisite, ”i the
justifications and • the conclusion of the default rule. The intuitive interpretation of such a
default rule is: if  is believed, and all ”i are consistent with the set of beliefs, then one can
infer the conclusion •. A default rule is called normal if its justification is identical to its
conclusion, i.e. if it is of the form (  : ” / ”). A default rule is called semi-normal if it is of
the form (  : ”  • / •). A default theory D  = < W , D  > consists of a set of logical
formulas W and a set of default rules D. The deductive closure of the union of W and a set of
conclusions of a default theory is called an extension E. In what follows Th(S) denotes the
deductive closure in a logic L of a set S of L-formulas, i.e. Th(S) = {˘ | S ƒ ˘}. To
distinguish Reiter's extensions from our constructive extensions, we will call the first R-
extensions.
Definition 2.1
A set of sentences E is an R-extension of the default theory D  = < W, D >, if E = 
i=0
 Ei,
where each layer Ei is defined as follows:
for i = 0,
E0 = W,
and for i ‡  0,
Ei+1 =  Th(Ei) fi { • | (  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D,  £ Ei, and  ”1,…,  ”n  E}.
Note that this definition is a fixed-point definition, which in principle is not constructive. In
the definition of the layer Ei+1 it is required that the formulas  ”1,…,  ”n are not
contained in E. Hence, the definition of each layer Ei+1 depends on the final outcome E. A
simple example illustrates this definition. Suppose D  = < W, D > with W = {b} and D =
(b :  p / f). This default rule says that if something is a bird, and it is not known to be a
4penguin, then one can assume it can fly. One can easily verify that the R-extension of D  is E =
Th({b, f}), hence the conclusion that it can fly, i.e. the formula f, is contained in E. However,
if we have the information in W that the object is a penguin, i.e. W' = {b, p}, then the default
theory D ' = < W ', D > has the R-extension E' = Th({b, p}), which does not contain the
formula f. This implies that in default logic conclusions are not preserved under information
growth.
2.2 Selection Functions
A selection function, which will be denoted by §, selects a subset of default conclusions from
the set of all default conclusions that can be derived at a certain layer. Indices i from an index
set I are added to indicate that the selection is made at the i-th reasoning step. The general
definition of a selection function is as follows.
Definition 2.2.1
Let L be a logic and let U be a set of well-formed formulas of L. Let P(U) denote the set of all
subsets V “ U, and let I be an index set. The function § : I x P (U)  P(U) is called a
selection function if for every subset V of U and every index i ; §(i,V) “ V.
Definition 2.2.2
Let D be a set of defaults. The set of consequences of D, denoted as Cons(D) is defined by
Cons(D) = {• | (  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D}. Suppose D  = < W, D > is a default theory and
§ : I x P (U)  P(U) is a selection function. We call § a selection function related to D  if U =
Cons(D). The set of selection functions related to D  is denoted by Sel(D ).
In this paper the index set I will always be the set of natural numbers, with the usual ordering.
The condition in Definition 2.2.1 says that § should not select a formula that is not contained
in V. Instead of §(i,V) we will also write simply §i(V). We will say that a selection function is
an identity selection function if for all V “ Cons(D) and for all i holds §i(V) = V. And we will
say that a selection is an empty selection function if for all V “ Cons(D) and for all i holds
§i(V) = ˚.
2.3 Constructive Extensions
First we define the notion of a §-constructive extension. This is a constructive extension of
which the construction is controlled by a selection function §.
5Definition 2.3.1
Let D  = < W, D > be a default theory and § be a selection function related to D . A set of
sentences C§ is called the §-constructive extension of the default theory D , if C§ = 
i=0
 C§ i ,
where
for i = 0,
C§0 = W,
for i ‡  0,
C§i+1 = Th(C§ i) fi §i+1(Cons(D§ i+1 )),
where
D§i+1 = {(  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D |  £ C§i, and  ”1,…,  ”n  Th(C§i)}.
We will call default logic based on §-constructive extensions Constructive Default Logic
(CDL). In the sequel we will refer to Reiter’s default logic with R-extensions as DL. If it is
clear from the context, we will usually omit the § prefix, and simply call it constructive
extension. For a given default theory D  = < W , D  > there is a collection of such §-
constructive extensions, parameterized by selection functions § £ Sel(D ).
Definition 2.3.2
Let D  = < W, D > be a default theory and suppose § is a selection function related to D . A
default rule (  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D is called applicable at stage i if (  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £
D§i. We say that a default (  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D is used in principle by § at stage i if it is
applicable and • £ §i(Cons(D§i)). In this case we also say that the formula • is selected by §
at stage i.
The next example shows that the choice of a selection function is very important.
Example 2.3.3
Let D  = < W, D > be a default theory with
W  = ˚     and   D  = {(  : p / p) ,  ( :  p /  p)}
Consider the identity selection function §, i.e. for all i and V “ Cons(D) we have §i(V) = V,
then § generates the constructive extension C§ = Th({p,  p}), which is inconsistent. This is
due to the fact that both defaults in D can be applied and are selected by § at stage C§1 in the
construction of C§, i.e. §1(Cons(D§1)) = {p,  p}.
From this example follows immediately the following observation.
6Observation 2.3.4
A constructive extension C§ of a default theory D  = < W, D > can be inconsistent, although
W is consistent.
This observation clearly distinguishes CDL from DL, because Reiter proved that every R-
extension of a default theory D  = < W, D > is inconsistent if and only if W is inconsistent.
Proposition 2.3.5 (see Corollary 2.2 in [Rei80])
Let E be an R-extension of the default theory D  = < W, D >, then E is inconsistent if and
only if W is inconsistent.
From Example 2.3.3 also follows immediately that DL and CDL are not equivalent for normal
defaults.
Observation 2.3.6
If D  = < W, D > is a default theory of which D consists only of normal default rules, then it
is generally not the case that for every constructive extension C§ of D  there is an R-extension E
of D  such that E = C§.
This distinguishes CDL from every alternative default logic proposed in the literature, because
all the alternative default logics I know of are equivalent to DL with respect to normal default
rules (for an extensive survey of alternative default logics see [FM92a,b]).
At first sight the type of inconsistency in Example 2.3.1 might look like something that has to
be prevented at all costs. However, in recent years more and more researchers have become
aware that inconsistencies are simply a fact of life, and that we must be able to represent them
in our knowledge representation formalisms. For example Gabbay and Hunter argued
extensively for the importance of maintaining inconsistencies in common sense reasoning
[GH91,92]. Actually there are already different logical formalisms that allow inconsistencies.
For example Belnap's 4-valued logic [Bel77] and da Costa’s paraconsistent logic [dC74]. In
[Tan92b] I discuss the Bi-Modular System (BMS), a meta-level architecture for non-
monotonic reasoning, that is based on a 4-valued logic similar to Belnap’s. Since BMS
corresponds to CDL in a well-defined way, this 4-valued logic can also be used for CDL. The
basic idea is that the deductive closure operator (Th) in Definition 2.3.1 is replaced by a
deductive closure operator under Belnap’s logic. This topic of representing inconsistencies
will be further investigated in another paper. Here we take a more conservative viewpoint, and
discuss how we can impose constraints on the selection functions in order to prevent
inconsistencies between default conclusions.
7Definition 2.3.7  (Local Consistency Constraint)
Let D  = < W, D > be a default theory, and let § be a selection function related to D . We say
that § satisfies the Local Consistency constraint, or short LC-constraint, if for all i and every
V “ Cons(D) we have that §i(V) is consistent.
This solves the inconsistency in Example 2.3.3, because the identity selection function §
selects §1(D§0) = {p,  p}, hence it does not satisfy the LC-constraint. Inconsistencies
between default conclusions can also occur between default conclusions that are selected at
different stages in the construction of a constructive extension. Hence, in addition to the local
consistency constraint we also need a global consistency constraint.
Definition 2.3.8  (Global Consistency Constraint)
Let D  = < W, D > be a default theory, and let § be a selection function related to D . We say
that § satisfies the Global Consistency constraint, or short GC-constraint, if for every
V “ Cons(D) we have that 
i=0
 §i(V) is consistent.
In addition to inconsistent default conclusions there is another phenomenon, which we call
non-groundedness, which is typical for constructive extensions. Consider the following
example.
Example 2.3.9  (Non-Groundedness example)
Let D  = < W, D > be a default theory with
W = { q   p }    and   D = { ( : p / q) }
Consider the identity selection function §, i.e. for all i and V “ Cons(D) we have §i(V) = V,
then § generates the constructive extension C§ = Th({q,  p}). This is counterintuitive,
because the justification p of the default rule (  : p / q) is violated by the conclusion of the
implication q   p.
What happens in this example is that the default rule defeats its own justification indirectly.
First the default can be applied at a certain stage, but at a later stage the conclusion of this
default leads to a violation of the justification of this default rule. Also this problem can be
solved by imposing a constraint, the so-called non-self-defeating constraint, on selection
functions.
Definition 2.3.10
A default (  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D that in principle is used at stage i by a selection function §
is called defeated by §, if there is some j ‡  i such that  ”k £ Th(C§j) for some k with
1 £  k £  n. We call § self-defeating if there is some stage i and some formula • that is
selected by § at i such that all defaults (  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D§i with consequence • are
8defeated by §. If § is not self-defeating, then we say that § is non-self-defeating (NSD), or
that it satisfies the NSD-constraint, or simply that it is NSD.
From this definition it is clear that empty selection functions satisf
trivially.
Observation 2.3.11
Every empty selection function satisfies the NSD-constraint.
It turns out that the NSD-constraint is a very strong constraint. In parti
the NSD-constraint subsumes the consistency constraints, where subsumption
defined as follows.
Definition 2.3.12  (Subsumption between constraints))
Let A and B be two costraints on selection functions. We say that A subsumes B, written
A  B, if we have for every selection function § that
If § satisfies the A-constraint, then § satisfies the B-constraint.
Note that the subsumption relation is reflexive and transitive. The GC-constraint subsumes the
LC-constraint, and the NSD-constraint subsumes the GC-constraint. Hence, we have the
following subsumption relation between the NSD-, GC- and LC-constraints.
NSD    GC    LC
We only prove that the NSD-constraint subsumes the GC-constraint. The oth
relation GC  LC is obvious. Moreover, NSD  LC follows immediately by the transitivity
of the subsumption relation.
Proposition 2.3.13  (NSD-constraint subsumes GC-constraint)
For every selection function § holds;
If § satisfies the NSD-constraint, then § satisfies the GC-constraint.
Proof.
Suppose § is a selection function related to D  = < W, D > that does not satisfy the GC-
constraint, then there is a stage i in the construction of the construcive extension C§ of D  such
that ij=0 §j(Cons(D§ j)) is inconsistent. Due to this inconsistency we know that Th(C§ i)
contains every formula, and so does C§ i+1. Hence, it is obvious that for every formula • that
9is selected by § at stage i holds that all defaults (  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D§i+1 are defeated by
§. This implies that § is self-defeating. fl
We also have the following result about the NSD-constraint.
Proposition 2.3.14
Let C§ be a constructive extension of the default theory D  = < W, D > with § satisfying the
NSD-constraint, then C§ is inconsistent if and only if W is inconsistent.
Proof. Straightforward.
It can happen that in the construction of stage j it turns out that some default conclusions that
were derivable at an earlier stage i < j are no longer derivable at j. In other words, it is not
guaranteed that if i < j, then §i(Cons(D§ i)) “ §j(Cons(D§ j)). For example, in Example 2.3.9
one can easily verify that the default conclusion q  is derivable at stage 1, i.e. q  £
§1(Cons(D§1)) and hence q £ C§ 1, but not anymore at stage 2, i.e. q  §2(Cons(D§ 2)). Note
that although q is not derivable as default conclusion at stage 2 this formula is still contained in
C§2, because q £ C§ 1 and C§1 “ C§ 2. Hence, we have the following observation.
Observation 2.3.15
If C§ is a constructive extension for the default theory D  = < W, D >, then it can happen that
for certain i and j with i < j, holds §i(Cons(D§ i))  §j(Cons(D§ j)).
Notice that this non-monotonic increase can be caused either by the constructive character of
C§ or the selection function §. In Example 2.3.9 this lack of monotonic increase in the
derivable default conclusions happens while the selection function is an identity function.
Hence, in this case this effect is not caused by the selection function, but purely by the
constructive character of the extension. But this non-monotonic increase can also be caused
purely by the selection function: e.g. if §j makes an empty selection, whereas §i(Cons(D§i)) is
non-empty.
Proposition 2.3.16
If C§  is a constructive extension for the default theory D  = < W, D >, then for each stage
i ‡  1 holds
C§i  “ Th(W fi ij=0 §j(Cons(D§j))),
where D§i = {(  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D |  £ C§i-1, and  ”1,…,  ”n  Th(C§i-1)}.
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Proof.
The proof is by induction on the stage i in the construction of the constructive extension C§ for
D  = < W , D  >.
i = 1: Suppose ˘ £ C§1. Then ˘ £ Th(C§0) or ˘ £ §1(Cons(D§1)).
If ˘ £ Th(C§0), then ˘ £ Th(W), and hence ˘ £ Th(W fi 1j=0 §j(Cons(D§j))).
If ˘ £ §1(Cons(D§1)), then ˘ £ Th(W fi 1j=0 §j(Cons(D§j))), because
§1(Cons(D§1)) “  1j=0 §j(Cons(D§j)).
i = m : Suppose ˘ £ C§m, then ˘ £ Th(C§m-1) or ˘ £ §m(Cons(D§m)).
If ˘ £ Th(C§m-1), then C§m-1 ƒ ˘. Hence, with the induction hypothesis it also follows that W
fi 
m-1
j=0 §j(Cons(D§j)) ƒ ˘. Since 
m-1
j=0 §j(Cons(D§ j)) “ 
m
j=0 §j(Cons(D§ j)) it also follows that W
fi 
m
j=0 §j(Cons(D§j)) ƒ ˘. Hence, it follows that ˘ £ Th(W fi 
m
j=0 §j(Cons(D§j))).
If ˘ £ §m(Cons(D§m)), then ˘ £ Th(W fi mj=0 §j(Cons(D§j))), because
§m(Cons(D§m)) “  mj=0 §j(Cons(D§j)). fl
The converse inclusion of this proposition, i.e. Th(W fi ij=0 §j(Cons(D§ j))) “ C§i, does not
hold. This can be argued as follows. Suppose ˘ £ Th(W  fi §i(Cons(D§i)), then W  fi
§i(Cons(D§i)) ƒ ˘. Since, W “ Th(C§i-1) we also have Th(C§ i-1) fi §i(Cons(D§ i)) ƒ ˘.
However, this does not yet imply that ˘ £ Th(C§i-1) fi §i(Cons(D§ i)).
Proposition 2.3.17
If C§ is a constructive extension for the default theory D  = < W, D > , then
C§ =  Th(W fi 
i=0
 §i(Cons(D§i))),
where D§i = {(  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D |  £ C§i-1, and  ”1,…,  ”n  Th(C§i-1)}.
Proof.
“ : Follows immediately from Proposition 2.3.16, and the fact that C§ 0 = W.
 : Suppose ˘ £ Th(W  fi 
i=0
 §i(Cons(D§ i))). Then there is a k such that ˘ £ Th(W  fi
k
i=0
 §i(Cons(D§ i))). If we can prove that W fi ki=0 §i(Cons(D§ i)) “ C§ k, then ˘ £ Th(C§k),
and hence ˘ £ C§. So, we only have to prove that
11
W fi k
i=0
 §i(Cons(D§i)) “ C§ k (= Th(C§k-1) fi §k(Cons(D§ k))}.
If · £ W, then · £ Th(C§k-1), since W “ Th(C§ k-1), and therefore · £ C§k.
If · £ k
i=0
 §i(Cons(D§ i)), then there is a j with 0 £  j £  k such that · £ §j(Cons(D§j)). This
implies that · £ C§j, and hence also that · £ C§k. fl
Satisfying the NSD-constraint is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a selection
function to determine an R-extension. It is easy to give examples of selection functions that are
NSD, but still do not define an R-extension, simple because they are not exhaustive. For
instance some applicable defaults may be not selected at any stage. The notion of
exhaustiveness is related to the concept of closure under a set of defaults.
Definition 2.3.18
Let D be a set of defaults and S be a set of sentences. We call S closed under D if, for every
default (  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D with  £ S and  ”1,…,  ”n  S, • £ S. Let D  = < W,
D  > be a default theory and suppose § is a selection function related to D . We call §
exhaustive for D if C§ is closed under D.
In [TT92] we proved the following theorem which says that constructive extensions which are
generated by selection functions that are non-self-defeating and exhaustive are equivalent to
Reiter's R-extensions. In other words, the set of all Reiter-extensions of a default theory D  is
equivalent to the set of all those constructive extensions C§ of D  that are generated by non-self-
defeating and exhaustive selection functions that are related to D .
Theorem 2.3.19
Let D  = < W, D > be a default theory.
{E | E is an R-extension of D }
=
{C§ | C§ is a §-constructive extension of D  with § NSD and exhaustive}
This theorem shows that Reiter's default logic is a special case of constructive default logic.
An interesting class of selection functions is the class of selection fun
defeating but not exhaustive. These non-exhaustive §-constructive extensions are
respects more intuitive than R-extensions. Lukaszewicz observed in [Luk84, 88] that R-
extensions sometimes yield counter-intuitive results. This can be illustrated with the following
example.
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Example 2.3.20
Let D  be the default theory with
W  =  ˚   and D  = {( : p / q), ( :  q / s )}.
The support for the conclusion q is as weak as the support for the conclusion s. In the first
case the formula  p should not be contained in the extension, and in the second case the
formula  q. Since W is empty, one intuitively expects that D  has two extensions; one that
contains q, and another one that contains s (or one extension that contains both conclusions).
However, D  has only one R-extension, namely E = Th({q}), which lacks s. The application
of the first default ( : p / q) blocks the application of the second default ( :  q / s),
because the justification of the second default is violated by the conclusion of the first one.
With §-constructive extensions these counter-intuitive results can be avoided. Consider two
selection functions § and §', of which the first one never selects the formula q, whereas the
second is the identity function that selects everything i.e. §'(V) = V for all V. It is clear that C§
= Th({s}), because the application of ( :  q / s) is no longer blocked by ( : p / q),
because the conclusion q is not selected by §. In addition there is also a §-constructive
extension of D , C§ ' = E = Th({q}), which contains the conclusion q. In this respect §-
constructive extensions are clearly more intuitive than R-extensions.
In the next sections we will see that the solution of Example 2.3.20 is directly related to the
so-called semi-monotonicity property of constructive default logic. A property that Reiter's
default logic lacks. Semi-monotonicity is an important property, because it was shown by
Guerreiro, Cassanova and Hemerly in [GCH90] that if a default logic is not semi-
monotonous, then it can never have a proof theory. Reiter observed already in [Rei80] that his
default logic does not have, in general, a proof theory, which he considered a serious
drawback of his logic.
Constructive extensions have a computational advantage over R-extensions. Selection
functions can be used as heuristics to generate extensions more adequately. A more detailed
discussion about the computational advantages of constructive default logic in comparison to
Reiter's default logic can be found in [TT92]. Of course not all computational problems of
default logic that were pointed out so ingeniously by Kautz and Selman in [KS91] are solved
by this constructive perspective on R-extensions. In particular the NSD and exhaustive
selection functions of §-constructive extensions that generate R-extensions in Theorem 2.3.19
might be very hard to specify. This specification problem is related to the fact that many of
these selection functions, that generate R-extensions, may contain a hidden belief revision
component. The NSD-constraint seems to presuppose a kind of look-ahead oracle. A default
rule ¶ , which is applicable at stage i, can only be selected at i, if its justifications will not be
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violated at any later stage j > i. Hence, to determine the selection §i at stage i, a look-ahead
oracle has to give the information whether justifications will be violated at a later stage j.
However, this problem of the look-ahead oracle could perhaps be avoided by postponing the
checking. Instead of checking whether the justifications of a selected default conclusion will
not be violated at a later stage, we simply select those applicable defaults we want, and check
at each later stage j whether the then applicable defaults do not have a conclusion that might
lead to the violation of an earlier selected default. Hence, this only includes a look-back check
on information already known! It is still an open question whether this look-back check works
for every NSD selection function. This topic will be further investigated in subsequent
research. However, even if no perfect control knowledge can be found, heuristic knowledge
may be available that restricts the search and the amount of backtracking needed.
3. Properties of § -Constructive Extensions
In this section we will show that constructive default has two important properties that Reiter's
default logic lacks. The first property is that every default theory has a constructive extension,
and the second property is semi-monotonicity. Both properties are necessary for a proof
theory for default logic.
It is well-known that some default theories do not have an R-extension in Reiter's default
logic. Consider the following example.
Example 3.1
Let D  be the default theory with A a consistent set of sentences
W  =  A   and D  = {( : p /  p)}.
This default theory has no R-extension E.
This lack of extensions (sometimes!) is always considered to be a serious flaw of Reiter's
default logic. The problem in Example 3.1 is not so much that the default ( : p /  p) has no
R-extension, since this default rule refutes itself. Rather the problem is that the consistent set
A has no R-extension at all. Roughly speaking, extensions in default logic can be considered
as the conclusion sets of a default theory D . Hence, if D  has no R-extension, then even the
consistent set A has no conclusions in Reiter's default logic. Clearly, this is undesirable. One
expects the consistent set A to have at least one extension that contains the deductive closure of
A, and nothing more. The underlying problem here is that this self-refuting default rule should
be ignored in the generation of the extension. Selection functions are a very natural way to
obtain this effect. In the general case we can prove that every default theory has at least one §-
constructive extension.
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Proposition 3.2  (Existence of C§ )
Every default theory D  has a §-constructive extension C§.
Proof.
One can easily check that for every default theory D  = < W, D > the empty selection function
§ related to D  generates the set C§ = Th(W) which is a constructive extension for D . fl
Since it was already observed that empty selection functions always satisfy the NSD-
constraint, it follows immediately from this proof that the existence of constructive extensions
is preserved under the NSD-constraint.
Corollary 3.3
Every default theory D  has a §-constructive extension C§  of which the selection function
satisfies the NSD-constraint.
Another property which is relevant for default logics is semi-monotonicity. Roughly speaking,
semi-monotonicity means that no conclusions are lost when new default rules are introduced.
Definition 3.4  (Semi-Monotonicity)
Let D  = < W, D > and D ' = < W, D ' > be two default theories such that D ' “ D. For any
extension E' for D ' there is an extension E for D  such that E' “ E.
Reiter's default logic is not semi-monotonous. Consider the following example.
Example 3.5
Let D  and D ' be two default theories such that
D  : W  =  ˚   and  D  = {( : p  / q  ), ( :  q  /  s )}
D ' : W  =  ˚   and  D ' = {( :  q /  s )}
Both default theories have exactly one R-extension. Let E be the R-extension of D , and E' the
R-extension of D '. Now it is obvious that the formula s is contained in E, but not in E'.
Hence, we have D' “ D and E'  E, which implies that Reiter's default logic is not semi-
monotonous.
Due to the selection functions we can show that constructive default logic is semi-
monotonous.
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Proposition 3.6  (Semi-monotonicity of CDL)
Let D  = < W, D > and D ' = < W, D ' > be two default theories such that D ' “ D. For any
constructive extension C§ ' for D ' there is a selection function § related to D  such that C§  is a
constructive extension for D  such that C§ ' “  C§ .
Proof
Let C§' be a constructive extension for D ' generated by the selection function §'. The idea of
the proof is to define a selection function § related to D  that makes exactly the same selections
as §', i.e. § ignores the conclusions of the extra defaults in D - D'. Let D§ i be the set of
defaults that are applicable at stage i in the construction of C§, i.e.
D§i = {(  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D |  £ C§i-1, and  ”1,…,  ”n  Th(C§i-1)}.
Now we define § as follows. For all V “ Cons(D), and for all i;
§i(Cons(D§i)) = §'i(Cons(D§ 'i)), and §i(V) = ˚ if V „  Cons(D§ i).
Since § ' is a function, it is obvious that § is also a function. Moreover, it also follows
immediately from this definition that we have for all i
C§i = C§ ' i (*)
Hence, we have C§ 'i “ C§ i for all i. If we can prove that § is a selection function related to D ,
then it follows immediately from the definition of § that C§ is a constructive extension of D .
Since §' is a selection function we know that for all i holds §'i(Cons(D§ 'i)) “ Cons(D§ ' i).
So, if we can prove that for all i holds Cons(D§ 'i) “ Cons(D§ i), then § is a selection function.
Suppose there is a stage i such that Cons(D§ 'i)  Cons(D§ i), then there is a default
(  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D' with  £ C§'i-1, and  ”1,…,  ”n  Th(C§'i-1), and (  : ”1,…,
”n / •)  D. Since D' “ D, it follows that C§i-1 „  C§ 'i-1, but this contradicts (*). Hence, for
all i holds Cons(D§ 'i) “ Cons(D§ i). fl
4. A Proof Theory for Constructive Default Logic
Let Pre(D) denote the set of prerequisites of the default rules in D, and Jus(D) the set of
justifications of default rules in D. A proof theory for default logic is defined as follows. We
use the definition of Guerreiro, Cassanova and Hemerly from [GCH90], which is a
generalization for arbitrary defaults of Reiter's definition of a default proof for normal default
as given in [Rei80].
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Definition 4.1
Let D  = < W, D > be a default theory and ˘ a sentence. A finite sequence < D0,…, Dk > of
finite subsets of D is a default proof of ˘ from D  iff:
1. W fi Cons(Dk) ƒ ˘,
2. For 1 £  i £  k, W fi Cons(Di-1) ƒ Pre(Di),
3. D0 =  ˚,
4. If W is consistent, then for each ” £ k
i=0
 Jus(Di) holds
W fi k
i=0
 Cons(Di) fi {”} is consistent.
The consistency requirement in condition (4) is needed for the following reason. If W is
inconsistent, then any finite sequence < D0,…, Dk > of finite subsets of D should be a proof
of any sentence ˘ from D . This property is important in proving that default proof theory is
complete.
First we give the definition for soundness and completeness of a default proof theory in the
general case, as they are given in [GCH90]. In these definitions E refers to the notion of
extension as it is defined in the particular default logic. For example, E refers to R-extensions
in Reiter’s default logic, and to constructive extensions in constructive default logic.
Definition 4.2  (Soundness of default proof theory)
If < D0,…, Dk > is a default proof of ˘ from D , then there is an extension E of D  such that ˘
£ E.
Definition 4.3  (Completeness of default proof theory)
If there is an extension E of D  such that ˘ £ E, then there is a < D0,…, Dk > which is a
default proof of ˘ from D .
Reiter observed already in [Rei80] that his default logic only has a sound and complete default
proof theory for the normal defaults, but not for non-normal ones. It can easily be illustrated
why Reiter’s default logic is not sound with respect to the default proof theory as defined in
Definition 4.1. Consider again the default theory D  = < A, {( : p /  p)} of Example 3.1
that has no R-extension. Let ˘ be a formula that follows classically from A, i.e. A ƒ ˘. Now it
is obvious that the sequence < D0 > with D0 = ˚ is a default proof of ˘ from D . However,
since D  does not have an R-extension there is certainly not an R-extension E of D  that contains
the formula ˘. Another reason that makes the proof theory unsound with respect to Reiter’s
default logic is related to the lack of semi-monotonicity. Consider the two default theories D  =
< ˚ , {( : p  / q), ( :  q  /  s)} > and D ' = < ˚ , {( :  q  /  s)} > from Example 3.5.
Now one can easily check that the sequence < D 0, D 1 > with D 0 = ˚  and D 1 =
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{( :  q / s)} is a default proof of the formula s from D  as well as D '. However, we argued
that D  has only one R-extension that does not contain the formula s.
Gueirrero, Cassanova and Hemerly showed in [GCH90] that the two properties existence and
semi-monotonicity of extensions are necessary conditions for a default proof theory which is
sound and complete with respect to a particular default logic. In other words, they showed
that if a particular default logic does not have the existence of extensions property or the semi-
monotonicity property, then it is impossible to define a default proof theory that is sound and
complete with respect to this default logic (see Theorem 13 in [GCH90]).
Since we showed in the previous section that constructive default logic has the existence
property as well as the semi-monotonicity property, it satisfies the necessary conditions for a
sound and complete proof theory. However, necessary conditions are not yet sufficient
conditions. We still have to prove positively that constructive default logic has a default proof
theory. This is done in the proofs of the following theorems.
Theorem 4.4 (Soundness of default proof theory w.r.t. CDL)
If there is a default proof of ˘ from D  = < W, D >, then there is a constructive extension C§
of D  such that ˘ £ C§.
Proof.
Suppose ˘  has a default proof from D  = < W , D  >. Then there is a finite sequence
< B0,…, Bk > of finite subsets Bi of D such that it is a default proof of ˘ from D . We use
this sequence to generate a constructive extension C§  of D  that contains the formula ˘ in the
following way.
Let D§i be again the set of defaults that are derivable at stage i in the construction of C§ , i.e.
for i > 1 we define
D§i = {(  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D |  £ C§i-1, and  ”1,…,  ”n  Th(C§i-1)}.
Now define the selection function § that is used to generate C§ as follows;
§2n(Cons(D§2n)) = Cons(Bn), for 0 £  n £  k,
§2n+1(Cons(D§2n+1)) =  ˚, for 0 £  n £  k,
§n(Cons(D§2n+1)) =  ˚, for n > 2k,
and for any V and any i such that V „  Cons(D§ i), we have §i(V) =  ˚.
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If we can prove that § is a selection function, then it follows immediately from the definition
of § that C§ is a constructive extension for D  such that ˘ £ C§. So, what remains to be proven
is that this § is a selection function.
Due to the definition given above it is trivially true that § is a function. To prove that § also
satisfies the requirement of a selection function we have to prove that for all stages i in the
construction of C§ holds §i(Cons(D§i)) “ Cons(D§ i). Note that this trivially holds for every
stage i with an empty selection; i.e. for i = 2n+1 with 1 £  n £  k, and for i > 2k. Hence, we
only have to prove
Cons(Bi) “ Cons(D§ 2i), for 0 £  i £  k.
Note that by definition B0 = ˚. Suppose • £ Cons(Bi) with 1 £  i £  k, then there is a default ¶
= (  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ Bi, and therefore we also have
(  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D. (1)
Since, < B0,…, Bk > is a default proof it follows that for any i with 1 £  i £  k holds W fi
Cons(Bi-1) ƒ Pre(Bi), and consequently it follows in particular that W fi Cons(Bi-1) ƒ .
Hence, by definition of § it also follows that W fi §2(i-1)(Cons(D§ 2(i-1))) ƒ , and thus we
have  £ Th(C§2(i-1)), and hence it follows that
 £ C§2i-1 (2)
Let SD§ i denote the set of applicable default rules from D§ i of which the conclusions are
selected by §i, i.e.
SD§i = {(  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D§i | • £ §i(Cons(D§i))}.
By definition of default proof it follows that each ” £ k
i=0
 Jus(Bi) is consistent with W fi
k
i=0
 Cons(Bi). Hence, this implies that
each ” £ 2k
i=0
 Jus(SD§ i) is consistent with W fi 2ki=0 Cons(SD§ i). (3)
Since we know from Proposition 2.3.17 that C§  = Th(W fi 
i=0
 §i(Cons(D§ i)), we also know
that C§ = Th(W fi 2k
i=0
 §i(Cons(D§ i)), because after stage 2k no new default conclusions are
selected by §. Since 2k
i=0
 §i(Cons(D§ i)) = 2ki=0 Cons(SD§ i), it follows from (3) that for all
justifications ”1,…,”n from the default rule ¶  we have  ”1,…,  ”n  C§, and hence also
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 ”1,…,  ”n  Th(C§2i-1). (4)
From (1), (2) and (4) it follows that ¶  £ D§ 2i, and therefore its conclusion • is contained in
Cons(D§2i). Consequently, § is a selection function. fl
We can even prove a stronger type of soundness, namely that if there is a default proof of ˘
from D  = < W, D >, then there is a constructive extension C§  of D  with a selection function
§ that is NSD such that ˘ £ C§. This type of soundness is called NSD-soundness.
Theorem 4.5 (NSD-soundness of default proof theory w.r.t. CDL)
If there is a default proof of ˘ from D  = < W, D >, then there is a constructive extension C§
of D  with a selection function § that is NSD such that ˘ £ C§.
Proof.
Suppose ˘  has a default proof from D  = < W , D  >, then there is a finite sequence
< B0,…, Bk > of finite subsets of D such that it is a default proof of ˘ from D . We use this
sequence to generate a constructive extension C§ of D  that contains the formula ˘ by defining
the selection function § exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4.4. We prove that § is NSD by
contraposition.
Suppose that § is not NSD, i.e. § is self-defeating. Hence, there is a stage i and a formula •
that is selected by § at stage i such that for every applicable default rule (  : ”1,…,”n / •) £
D§i with conclusion •  there is some later stage j > i such that  ”m £ Th(C§j) with
1 £  m £  n. This implies that  ”m £ C§, hence by Proposition 2.3.17 it also follows that
 ”m £ Th(W fi i=0 §i(Cons(D§i))). Since every selection of § after stage 2k is by definition
empty, it follows that
Th(W fi 
i=0
 §i(Cons(D§ i))) = Th(W fi 2ki=0 §i(Cons(D§ i))),
and hence  ”m £ Th(W fi 2ki=0 §i(Cons(D§ i))). Since,
 
2k
i=0
 §i(Cons(D§i)) = ki=0 Cons(Bi) ,
it follows that W fi k
i=0
 Cons(Bi) fi {”m} is inconsistent, which contradicts the assumption
that the sequence < B0,…, Bk > satisfies condition (4) of the definition of a default proof. fl
We can only prove completeness with respect to a subclass of constructive extensions; namely
the extensions that are NSD. This restriction is needed for the following reason. Consider
again Example 2.3.9. In this example there was a default theory D  with W = {q   p} and
D  = {( : p / q)}. This D  has a constructive extension C§ = Th({q ,  p}) of which the
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selection function § is not NSD. One can easily verify that the only way to derive the formula
q with a default proof from D  is with a sequence < B0,…, Bk > such that ( : p / q) £ Bk.
However, with respect to this sequence we have that W  fi  k
i=0
 Cons (Bi) fi  {p} is
inconsistent, hence it violates condition (4) of the definition of a default proof, and therefore
this sequence is not a default proof. This argument can be generalized to a proof for the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.6
If C§ is a constructive extension for a default theory D  = < W, D > with a selection function
§ that is not NSD, then C§ contains at least one formula ˘ for which there exists no default
proof from D .
Proof. Straightforward.
Theorem 4.7 (NSD-completeness of default proof theory w.r.t. CDL)
Let C§ be a constructive extension of a default theory D  = < W, D > where D is a finite set
of defaults. If a formula ˘ is contained in C§ and the selection function § is NSD, then there is
a default proof of ˘ from D .
Proof.
Let the formula ˘ be contained in a constructive extension C§  of a default theory D  =
< W, D > with a selection function § that is NSD. Let D§ i be the set of defaults that are
derivable at stage i in the construction of C§, i.e. for i > 0 we define again
D§i = {(  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D |  £ C§i-1, and  ”1,…,  ”n  Th(C§i-1)}.
And let SD§i again denote the set of applicable default from D§i of which the conclusions are
selected by §i, i.e.
SD§i = {(  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ D§i | • £ §i(Cons(D§i))}.
Let C§k be the first stage in C§ that contains ˘. If k = 0, then ˘ £ C§0 = W, and one can easily
verify that the sequence < B0 > with B0 = ˚ is a default proof of ˘ from D . If k > 0, then
define each set Bi in the finite sequence < B0,…, Bk > as follows
B0 = ˚  and  Bi = 
i
j=0 SD
§ j , for  1 £  i £  k.
It is obvious that < B0,…, Bk > is a finite sequence of finite subsets, because the set of
defaults D is finite. We have to prove that this sequence is a default proof. We check the four
conditions of Definition 4.1.
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(1) First we have to prove that W fi Cons(Bk) ƒ ˘. Since we have ˘ £ C§ k with k ‡  1 it
follows by Proposition 2.3.16 that ˘ £ Th(W fi kj=0 §j(Cons(D§j))). Since
 
k
j=0 §j(Cons(D§j)) = 
k
j=0 Cons(SD§ j) = Cons(
k
j=0 SD
§ j) = Cons(Bk),
it follows that ˘ £ Th(W fi Cons(Bk)), and hence W fi Cons(Bk) ƒ ˘.
(2) Next we have to prove that for each i with 1 £  i £  k holds
W fi Cons(Bi-1) ƒ Pre(Bi).
Let  £ Pre(Bi), then there is a default (  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ Bi. Since, Bi = ij=0 SD§ j we
also know that there is an m with 0 £  m £  i such that (  : ”1,…, ”n / •) £ SD§m, and
hence  £ C§m-1.
Consequently, by Proposition 2.3.16 it follows that  £ Th(W fi m-1j=0 §j(Cons(D§j))). Since
m £  i, it follows that  £ Th(W fi i-1j=0 §j(Cons(D§ j))). Since,
 
i-1
j=0 §j(Cons(D§j)) = 
i-1
j=0 Cons(SD§ j) = Cons(
i-1
j=0 SD
§ j) = Cons(Bi-1),
it also follows that  £ Th(W fi Cons(Bi-1)), and hence W fi Cons(Bi-1) ƒ .
(3) B0 =  ˚ follows by definition.
(4) Finally, we have to show that if W is consistent, then for each ” £ k
i=0
 Jus(Bi) holds that
W  fi  k
i=0
 Cons(Bi) fi {”} is consistent. Assume W is consistent, and that for a certain ”' £
k
i=0
 Jus(Bi) the set of sentences W fi ki=0 Cons(Bi) fi {”'} is inconsistent. Note that 
k
i=0
 Bi =
Bk, hence it follows that
 
k
i=0
 Jus(Bi) = Jus( ki=0 Bi) = Jus(Bk).
Let SD§ j be the first stage in Bk in which a default is applicable with the justification ”' of
which the conclusion is selected by §j. Since this default is applicable in SD§ j, it follows that
 ”'  Th(C§ j-1). But this implies that  ”' must have been derived at a later stage C§m with
j £  m £  k, which contradicts the assumption that the selection function § is NSD. fl
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5. Conclusions
Reiter's original default logic lacks a default proof theory for non-normal default rules, which
was already observed by Reiter himself to be a weakness of his logic. In this paper we have
shown that constructive default logic does have a default proof theory. We have also shown
that this is intrinsically related to the fact that default theories in CDL always have a
constructive extension (the existence property), and that CDL also has the semi-monotonicity
property. Furthermore, we have shown that, with respect to some counter-examples that were
suggested by Lukaszewicz, constructive extensions yield more intuitive conclusions than
Reiter’s extensions. Hence, constructive default logic does not only have heuristic advantages
over default theory from a computational point of view, but it is also more adequate with
respect to knowledge representation.
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